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INTRODUCTION

The G20/OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project aimed at revising existing tax
rules to align the taxation of profit with the location of economic activities and value creation (the
“value creation principle”). It has received much commentary in literature and general debates 1
and has been regarded as “the most significant re-write of the international tax rules in a century”, 2
an opportunity to “rebuild a healthy scheme for allocating taxation rights”, 3 having the potential
to significantly alter the contours of the international tax regime, 4 transforming the international
tax regime, 5 signaling a “new struggle over international taxation”, 6 or representing the
“emergence of a new international tax regime”. 7 The OECD claimed that the revised rules
represent “the first substantial – and overdue - renovation of the international tax standards in
almost a century”. 8
In this paper, we suggest that the ambitious BEPS Project 9 represents a shift from a bilateral system
to a multilateral global system of taxing multinational enterprises (MNEs). We further argue that
the misconceived and controversial “value creation principle” may have a fighting chance of being
the basis for the global tax system in the 21st Century. We propose a global profit split approach
allocating MNEs’ global profits to countries where value is created and explain the pros and cons
of this proposal.
The scope of this paper is limited to the impact of the BEPS project on the allocation of MNEs’s
global profits among countries for tax purposes. It does not consider the general corporate tax
issues, such as tax rate and integration of corporate tax and personal income tax, which, we believe,
will continue to be defined by domestic fiscal policies. It also does not dwell into the jurisdictional
nexus issue, even though the tax presence (physical, economic or digital) of an MNE in a country
can be unclear in some cases, such as digital businesses.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Following the Introduction, Part 2 provides an overview
of the BEPS Project and signs of shifting international tax paradigm towards a global approach.
Part 3 discusses the value creation principle and its implications for the emerging global tax
approach. Part 4 proposes a global profit split approach to allocating MNEs’ global profits and
compares it to other proposals. It makes the case that the global profit split approach can be
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designed to reflect the value creation principle, although significant challenges exist, and has a
chance of being implemented by countries in the 21st century.

2

THE BEPS PROJECT AND SHIFTING INTERNATIONAL TAX PARADIGM

2.1 Overview
The Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project began in July 2013 when OECD and G20
countries agreed on the need for multilateral efforts to tackle the problem of BEPS. 10 “BEPS refers
to tax planning strategies that exploit gaps and mismatches in tax rules to artificially shift profits
to low or no-tax locations where there is little or no economic activity.” 11 BEPS is problematic
from the perspective of G20 and OECD countries because it causes the loss of tax revenue, 12
“undermines the fairness and integrity of tax systems” and undermines “voluntary compliance by
all taxpayers”. 13 Addressing the BEPS problem and “ensuring that all taxpayers pay their fair share
of taxes is more than ever a priority” in those countries in the context of “severe fiscal
consolidation and social hardship” following the 2008 global financial crisis. 14 In other words,
tackling BEPS practices of MNEs was politically and fiscally important.
The root cause of the BEPS problem was diagnosed to be the defective tax rules (such as gaps and
mismatches in international tax rules in different countries) which allow MNEs to legally but
artificially shift profits to low or no-tax jurisdictions where the business has little or no economic
activity. Since the issues lie with the tax rules themselves and the goal of the BEPS Project is to
“revise the rules to align them to developments in the world economy, and ensure that profits are
taxed where economic activities are carried out and value is created.” 15 We suggest below that
these rewritten rules signal a shift away from the existing bilateral international tax regime to a
multilateral global regime of taxing MNEs.

2.2 Existing International Tax Paradigm
Under the existing international tax regime, an MNE is generally liable to tax in each country in
which it has a business presence in the form of a local company or permanent establishment. The
governing tax laws are domestic laws and bilateral tax treaties. International tax rules in domestic
laws generally impose tax on a company that is a member of a MNE group on the basis of the
company’s domestic residence or domestic source of income. For example, under the Canadian
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Income Tax Act 16 (ITA), a resident company 17 is taxable on its worldwide income under
subsections 2(1) and (2) and section 3, while a non-resident company is taxable on its Canadian
source income, such as carrying on business in Canada, realizing capital gains from disposition of
taxable Canadian property or receiving interest, rent, royalty or dividends from a Canadian resident
payer. 18 Section 247 contains transfer pricing rules to, in effect, test the price of related-party
transactions against the arm’s length principle. Bilateral tax treaties typically follow the OECD
Model Convention 19 and/or the UN Model Convention 20 and allocate taxing rights between the
two countries on the basis of residence and/or source of income. Tax treaties also authorize the tax
authorities to adjust the profits of an associated enterprise in accordance with the arm’s length
principle.
Even though the residence-source paradigm and the arm’s length principle are found in the
domestic law of many countries, the detailed rules to determine residence, source of income, the
amount of profit for tax purposes tend to differ from country to country. Even the transfer pricing
rules that tend to be informed by the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines are implemented
differently across countries. Tax treaties “bridge” the two countries’ tax systems in order to prevent
double taxation, tax evasion or tax avoidance, but they do not require the domestic laws be
coordinated or “synchronized”. As such, there are gaps, overlaps and mismatches between
domestic tax laws. Furthermore, because tax law generally defers to private law for determining
the nature of transactions and private laws may differ from country to country, divergence in
private laws also results in divergence of tax laws. For example, a financing transaction may be
treated as debt in one country, but equity in another.
While the business of MNEs is global, tax-related information about the global business is not
available to the tax authorities of any given country. Under the laws of a specific country, the
obligation to file tax returns is limited to taxpayers, which are local subsidiaries or non-resident
companies with a permanent establishment. For example, under the Canadian ITA, the tax
reporting obligation falls on taxpayers that are liable to Part I tax (i.e. resident companies or nonresident companies carrying on business in Canada). The Canadian subsidiary of a foreign-based
MNE is not required to report on the global income of the MNE group. As such, each country in
which the MNE operates has partial information about the MNE’s business. There is asymetry in
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tax information between MNEs and the tax authority of a country, and a serious issue of “endemic
and worrying lack in data and information”. 21
Taxpayers have the right to engage in tax planning and minimize their taxes. Legal fictions and
legal arrangements are generally respected by tax laws; they are “ignored” or “looked through” for
tax purposes only in specific circumstances. Meanwhile, countries engage in tax competition in
order to attract investment by MNEs. Some countries do not even impose corporate income tax
and function as “tax havens”. Through tax planning strategies such as debt financing, transfer
pricing, tax arbitrage and treaty shopping, an MNE can shift profits earned in production countries
or market countries to entites located in tax havens where the MNE has little or no economic
activity.
The existing international tax regime was created almost 100 years ago. It has evolved somewhat
in technical details, but the residence-source paradigm has remained the same. Each country seeks
to determine the amount of taxable income of a member of an MNE group by reference to
observable evidence or activities and adheres to the principle of taxing each company as a separate
enity and then rely on the arm’s length principle to prevent income shifiting by members of an
MNE group. Meanwhile, the business of MNEs has become global in nature and more reliant on
intangible property and technology. Globalisation and digitation have exacerbated the impact of
gaps and frictions among different countries’ tax systems. The “web” of national tax laws
encountered by an MNE has serious holes and gaps to allow its income to find its way to a tax
haven.

2.3 Revisions by the BEPS Project
The G20 and OECD member countries represent the world’s largest economies and suffer the most
from MNEs’ tax planning practices. Since neither the G20 or OECD has any tax law-making power
and cannot actually rewrite any tax rules directly, the BEPS Project developed measures for
countries to incorporate into their laws or tax treaties. 22
The OECD Action Plan on BEPS (2013) 23 identified 15 actions to address the root cause of BEPS
by: introducing coherence in the domestic rules; reinforcing substance requirements in the existing
international standards; improving information reporting and transparency; and introducing a
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multilateral instrument. 24 The final reports on these actions contain recommendations, which take
the form of minimum standards to be enacted into domestic law, 25 updated standards, 26 common
approaches 27 or best practices, 28 depending on the level of consensus reached. 29
To improve coherency, common approaches are recommended to deal with hybrid mismatch
arrangements and interest deductibility. In the case of hybrid arrangements, for example, the
approach is to eliminate gaps or mismatch by linking the domestic rules of different countries. 30
In the case of interest deductibility, the recommended approach is based on a fixed ratio rule which
limits an entity’s net deductions for interest and payments economically equivalent to interest to a
percentage of its earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA). The
recommended corridors of possible ratios is 10% and 30%. 31
The substance of taxpayers’ activities (as opposed to legal form or legal arrangements) is
emphasized in Actions 8-10 Report titled “Aligning Transfer Pricing Outcomes with Value
Creation”. Recognizing that the arm’s length principle is the cornerstone of transfer pricing rules
and the existing guidance on the application of the principle has proven vulnerable to manipulation,
the revised rules aim to “secure outcomes that see operational profits allocated to the economic
activities which generate them”. 32 They authorise the disregarding of the transactions between
associated enterprises that lack commercial rationality and emphasize that the allocation of profits
to risks and intangibles be based on substantive contributions in fact as opposed to contractual
allocation of risks or mere legal ownership of intangibles. 33
To address the tax information problem, a minimum standard on country-by-country reporting
(CbCR) was introduced in Action 13. Under the CbCR standard, a MNE must fill out a master
file (on a template prepared by the OECD) and files it with the country where its head office is
based. The template includes information on the structure of the MNE group, the global value
chains and payments made by members of the group to each other. The reporting also covers
information on revenue, profit, tax paid, stated capital, accumulated earnings, number of
employees and tangible assets as well as the company’s overall strategy for the development,
ownership and exploitation of intangibles. The master file received by the country where the head
office is based is then shared with the tax authorities of the countries where the MNE has
operations.
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To reduce gaps and frictions among different tax systems which are coordinated through several
thousands of bilateral tax treaties, Action 15 of the BEPS Project recommended a multilateral
mechanism for speedy amendment of existing bilateral tax treaties. 34 A Multilateral Convention
to Implement the Tax Treaty Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (“Multilateral
Instrument” or “MLI”) was developed and has now be signed by over 86 countries, 35 including
Canada. Pursuant to the MLI, Canada is able to modify its current tax treaties with countries which
have also signed the MLI. The MLI includes a minimum standard on preventing treaty abuse and
another minimum standard on resolving tax disputes through the mutual agreement procedure.
G20 Leaders endorsed the BEPS recommendations and strongly urged “the timely implementation
of the project and encourage all countries and jurisdictions, including developing ones, to
participate”. 36 An inclusive framework was developed in 2016 to monitor the implementation of
BEPS measures globally, 37 and had over 130 countries participating by the end of December 2018.
A global Platform for Collaboration on Tax was launched in April 2016 by the International
Monetary Fund, OECD, United Nations and World Bank Group to provide technical assistance to
interested developing economies.

2.4 Emerging Shift of the International Tax Paradigm
The BEPS Project signals a shift away from the existing bilateral regime of residence-source based
taxation towards a multilateral regime of value-creation based taxation. Such shift is by no means
clear or controversy-free. After highlighting the signs of such shift, this section points out the
controversies and challenges.
2.4.1 Signs of shift
Signs of shift include the standard-setting institutions and processes, the adoption of the value
creation principle, recognizing the global nature of MNEs’ businesses, introducing a global
standard for tax reporting by MNEs and information sharing by governments, establishing a global
monitoring mechanism for implementation, and introducing a multilateral legal instrument that
affects or backstop the distribution of taxing powers among countries.
“For the first time all OECD and G20 countries have worked together on an equal footing to design
common responses to international tax challenges.” 38 In the past, international tax standards (or
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soft law) had been developed by the OECD and developed countries. The BEPS project involved
more countries (notably emerging countries such as China, India, Russia, etc.) and international
organizations, including the African Tax Administration Forum, IMF, the World Bank and the
United Nations. The problems of BEPS were considered “global” in nature and BEPS Project
sought to avoid having competing sets of international standards which could lead to “global tax
chaos”. 39
The BEPS Project took a more “global” view of MNEs and emphasized taxing MNEs in
accordance with the value creation principle. In effect, this approach renders the existing
residence-source paradigm virtually irrelevant to taxing MNEs. For example, BEPS Action 4
(interest deduction) Action 13 (CbCR) and Actions 8-10 (transfer pricing) provide signals of
treating MNEs as global firms. The EBITSA or EBIT rule in Action 4 takes into account the
worldwide MNE group’s interest-to-EBITDA ratio. The CbCR requires the filing of a “master
file” which contains information on the MNE group. Profit split methods under the updated
trahsfer pricing rules take into account of a MNE’s global value chain analysis.
Bilateral tax treaties are being amended through a multilateral legally-binding instrument. So, tax
rules in both domestic law and tax treaties are now more global. Tax administrations have access
to tax information through a global mechanism. 40
The BEPS Project and related initiatives, such as the common reporting standard and global
information sharing platforms increased the legal obligation of MNEs to report tax information
and the capacity of tax authorities to obtain information. The Inclusive Framework has some
promise of actually ensuring “widespread and consistent implementation” of new international tax
standards. 41
Overall, the BEPS Project is signaling a shift towards a global approach for taxing MNEs. Such
shift was an reaction to the tax problems arising from global financial crisis and fundamental
challenges posted by globalization and digitation to the existing international tax regime created
for an industrial, physical economy. The shift amplified by the BEPS, but there were earlier
undercurrents of shifting.
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2.4.2 Evolutionary Nature of the shift
Recent shift away from the traditional international tax paradigm was motivated by addressing the
fundamental mismatch between the paradgim and the new realities of a global digital economy,
the rise of MNEs, and the global power shifts away from the United States and the OECD.
The OECD has been the main caretaker of international tax standards and a “global tax
policeman”

42

in recent decades. For example, the OECD Model Tax Convention and

Commentaries as well as the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines are important sources of “soft
law”. To minimize the negative effects of harmful tax competition, which was regarded as an
“emerging global issue” in the 1990s 43 the OECD launched an initiative in 1998 to establish a
multilateral approach to tackle this issue so that countries could operate individually and
collectively to limit the extent of these harmful practices. The OECD also led initiatives in tackling
the tax challenges of e-commerce and digital businesses and creating the Global Forum on
transparency and exchange of information for taxation. 44 The shifting of global geopolitical power
towards the G20 brings with it the shifting of power in setting international tax standards. As a
group, non-OECD members of the G20 have different preferences about how the international tax
system should be reshaped as the existing system better serves the interests of OECD countries. 45
The rise of MNEs and the perception of lack of fairness in the existing system of taxing MNEs
goes beyond the allocating of taxing rights between countries. At taxpayers’ level, the ability of
MNEs to minimize their taxes was perceived to be unfair, resulting in erosion of public confidence
in the tax system. Further, corporate income tax has at least two important functions in democratic
countries: it raises revenue to finance public spending, including social programs; it backstops
progressive personal income tax to ensure progressive taxation, which is the main means of
redistributing social income. Therefore, corporate tax avoidance weakens these two functions and
has a direct impact on welfare of citizens. The 2008 Global Financial Crisis helped exposing the
link between tax avoidance and social welfare. The public exerted political pressure on
governments to prevent erosion of their welfare by MNEs.
At a technical level, through the efforts of the OECD and the United Nations, transfer pricing rules
have evolved towards more substance-based analysis in recent years and developing countries
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have demanded more source-based taxing rights. The most recent example of the latter is the new
provision on service fees in Article 12A of the UN Model Convention. 46
2.4.3 Unilateralism in action and challenges ahead
The signals of shift towards a global approach to taxing MNEs are by no means universal. In fact,
judging by the actions taken by some countries, unilateralism is very much at play. It is true than
many BEPS recommendations have been implemented by many countries. For example, over 100
countries (including most EU patent box countries 47 ) have committed to implementing BEPS
Action 5 (Countering Harmful Tax Practices More Effectively, Taking Into Account Transparency
and Substance). Of the 175 preferential tax regimes reviewed by the Forum on Harmful Tax
Practices, 31 regimes have been changed; 81 regimes require legislative changes which are in
progress; 47 regimes have been determined to not pose a BEPS risk; 4 have harmful or potentially
harmful features and 12 regimes are still under review. 48
However, implementation of other BEPS Measures varies greatly. Some OECD countries which
suffer from sophisticated tax planning using hybrid instruments or entities or financing
transactions have implemented the common approaches recommended in Action 2 and Action 4.
Examples are the adopt of EBITDA in the EU, USA, Australia, and South Africa, and hybrid rules
in Australia, France, Germany and UK. 49 In the case of developing countries, implementation is
more limited, for several possible reasons. The BEPS Measures were not designed to deal with the
issues faced by developing countries, 50 even though substantial efforts were made to take the
viewpoints of developing countries into account by the BEPS Project. Developing countries are
primarily concerned with the erosion of source-based taxation (through transfer pricing, avoidance
of permanent establishment status, or treaty shopping and avoidance of taxation of service fees or
capital gains of non-residents from offshore indirect sales). They also have limited capacity to
respond to BEPS problems. 51 Not surprisingly, developing countries have generally chosen to
implement Actions 8-10 and 13 on transfer pricing. 52
Meanwhile, unilateral actions have been taken by countries in the name of combatting BEPS.
Some are legislative, including the diverted profit tax in the United Kingdom and Australia,53
GILTI rules in the United States, 54 equalization levy in India, digital services tax in the UK. 55 Tax
auditors in many countries have been reportedly emboldened by the BEPS Project and taken an
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aggressive stance against foreign MNEs. For example, the number of tax controversies has risen
in Asia and other countries. 56
The difficulties facing a shift to a global approach to taxing MNEs are evident in the process of
developing consensus in taxing digital businesses. The BEPS Project did not contain a final report
on Action 1 regarding digital economy. There are ongoing concerns around the ability of the
existing tax rules (including the revised rules) to meet the needs of a rapidly digitalising economy.
At the request of the G20 Finance Ministers, the Inclusive Framework issued the “Interim Report
on the Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalisation” in March 2018. The Interim Report 57 still
contains no consensus-based measures to tackle the broader tax issues, after analyzing a number
of options, including some domestic legislative measures. According to the report, there was no
consensus on whether new rules are needed and if so, whether the new rules should apply only to
digital businesses (ring-fencing). There was also no consensus on whether users create value and
if so, how much value is created. Work continues towards a consensus-based, global solution by
2020. 58

3

THE VALUE CREATION PRINCIPLE

A paradigm shift towards a global approach to taxing MNEs faces many challenges, including
political, institutional, legal and administrative challenges. A unifying principle to guide the
allocation of taxing rights over MNEs’ global profits would be critical. Is the value creation
principle such a principle? In this section, we briefly discuss the meaning, scope and role of this
principle.

3.1 The Principle and Its Ambiguities
The BEPS Project’s stated goal to “revise the rules to align them to developments in the world
economy, and ensure that profits are taxed where economic activities are carried out and value is
created” 59 has been regarded as introducing the value creation principle. 60 “The ascendency of the
value creation principle has been remarkable, as has its influence.” 61 However, the BEPS Project
did not elaborate on the meaning of “value creation” and the principle suffers from significant
ambiguities.
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3.1.1 Where does the principle come from?
The notion of “value creation” itself is “new” in international tax discussions, except in regard to
transfer pricing issues associated with intangibles. There is no single provision in the OECD Model
Convention and existing tax treaties that can be identified as referencing, explicitly or implicitly,
to value creation. Similarly, there is no existing international tax provisions in the Canadian
Income Tax Act that refers to value creation.
The existing international tax system distributes taxing rights between countries on the basis of
residence and source. Neither residence or source is explicitly linked to the place of value creation,
although they might be originally used as proxies for measuring the “ability to pay” or the host
country’s “contribution” to the corporate taxpayer’s income-earnign activities. 62
There is no clear theoretical underpinning of the value creation principle. The BEPS Project does
not reject the theories that support the existing system, that is, the economic allegiance theory, the
benefit theory, the neutrality theory. 63 Therefore, the value creation principle could be viewed as
a new interpretation of existing theories. This is perhaps most obvious in the debates about taxing
digital businesses. For example, the UK government views the participation and engagement of
users as an important aspect of value creation for digital business, and the location of users in the
UK could be read as that the non-resident digital business companies owe “economic allegiance”
to UK as they derive benefits from the infrastructure provided by the UK. 64
3.1.2 What creates value?
What creates value for tax purposes? Some clues may be gleaned from the BEPS reports. For
example, the reports on digital economy mention user and/or customers as potential value drivers
in digital businesses. The Master (global) File and Local (country) file required by the CbCR
reporting 65 mention important drivers of business profit, such as key functions performed,
important risks assumed, and important assets used, for the development, ownership and
exploitation of intangibles, central financing function for the group. 66
The BEPS Project seems to suggest that the notion of value creation refers to the value or profit
generated by the activities of a MNE group (that is, the supply side). 67 Financial accounting data
for the MNE group and a local entity is an important source of information for determining profits.
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However, in allocating the group profit to a specific country, “demand side” factors, such as “local
market features”, including location savings and consumer preferences or market premium, can be
relevant factors in comparability analysis and splitting residual profit of the group. 68 Some
commentators suggest, however, that value realization through sales or marketization of goods and
services also create value. 69
3.1.3 Does the principle function as a source rule?
There are concerns about establishing rules to implement the value creation principle. 70 Can it
become a source rule? The debates about digital taxation seem to suggest that the principle can be
a source rule to justify the taxation of remote digital businesses on the basis of a digital presence.
Since the BEPS Project does not elaborate what the “base” in “base erosion and profit shifting” is
and invokes anti-avoidance rules to protect the tax base, it can be assumed that BEPS Project
regarded the value creation principle as the basis for establishing the existing tax base. This is
consistent with the rewriting objective of the BEPS project. In this sense, the value creation
principle plays a role of the benefit principle or even the economic allegiance theory in providing
a broader rationale for a country to claim taxing right over international income.
As a territorial source rule, however, can the place of economic activities and place of value
creation be separate? In the case of profit derived from intangibles, group synergies and other
mobile factors, determining the location of value creation is challenging. Capital importing
countries will have different perspectives from capital exporting countries. “Production” countries
may disagree from market countries about the value generated by customers.
The value creation principle can be used as a negative source rule. The BEPS Project seems to rely
on this principle to justify anti-abuse rules in the area of treaty shopping, permanent establishment
and transfer pricing to deny taxing rights of jurisdictions where no value is created. This can be
seen from the Tax Annex to the Saint Petersburg G20 Leaders Declaration (2013), which refers to
this principle only in the context of these three areas. 71 In the BEPS Package, the value creation
principle was most relevant in Actions 8-10 on transfer pricing and Action 1 on the taxation of
digital businesses based on the existence of a permanent establishment in an economic or digital
sense. In effect, the value creation principle can be viewed as a negative source rule: a MNE’s
profit should not be considered taxable in a country where there are no economic activities or value
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creation. This is clear in the case of the revised transfer pricing rules which deny profit from being
recognized in an intermediary country.
3.1.4 What is the relationship to the arm’s length principle?
What is the relationship between the value creation principle and the arm’s length principle? One
view is that the value creation principle is a benchmark for testing the outcome of applying the
arm’s length principle. Because of “the perceived emphasis on contractual allocations of functions,
assets and risks” under the existing guidance, the arm’s length principle has been proven
vulnerable to manipulation, leading to outcomes “which do not correspond to the value created
through the underlying economic activity carried out by the members of an MNE group.” 72
Therefore, the BEPS Action Plan required rewriting the guidance on the arm’s length principleby
emphasizing substance, economic activities, value creation as opposed to self-serving contractual
and legal arrangements. As such, the value creation principle’s function is of “a corrective nature”
– “a method for countering abusive constructions and not as an independent new standard.” 73
However, it is questionable whether the arm’s length principle was intended to be refereced to
value principle.
The flaws of the existing transfer price methods, which are already known, may be
further burdened with flaws of the concept of value creation, of which there is only
currently a limited awareness. Such a combination would give better results only if
the arm’s length principle could be considered to be an indirect proxy for taxation
where value is created, which would sometimes have to be corrected by direct
observation of the created value. However, at least historically, this has not been
the purpose of the arm’s length standard, which is intended to realize market
neutrality between integrated and non-integrated businesses, but not necessarily in
accordance with value creation. 74
Another view is that the BEPS Action Plan contemplated that the value creation principle can be
broader than the arm’s length principle: “if transfer pricing risks remain after clarifying and
strengthening the guidance, the BEPS Action Plan foresaw the possibility of introducing special
measures either within or beyond the arm’s length principle.” (emphasis added) 75 Presumably, the
purpose of this approach is two-fold: removing the unnecessary debate about consistency of the
revised transfer pricing measures with the arm’s length principle; and setting the stage for
innovative ways of better allocating global profits of MNEs among countries. This approach is
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critical to the BEPS Project because some G20 countries have different views about the arm’s
length principle. 76 For example, China and India have taken a more holistic, global and substanceover-form approach to applying the arm’s length principle. 77
The point where the arm’s length principle ends and the value creation principle continues is
debatable. History suggests that there is a spectrum for implementing the arm’s length principle,
ranging from comparable transactional pricing methods to transactional profit split methods. Even
though the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines regard formulary apportionment method to be
inconsistent with the arm’s length principle, opposing views exist. 78 The Common Consolidated
Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) in EU 79 and the proposed digital taxation measures in the UK move
closer to formulary apportionment. The BEPS Project has authorized an expanded use of profit
split method, especially in regard to allocating income arising from “synergistic benefits benefits
of operating as a group” and “integrated global value chains.” 80 It could be said that the transfer
pricing regime under the value creation principle is moving closer to allocating an MNE’s profit
on a global basis.

3.2 Potential basis for a global corporate tax system
“It is now widely taken as axiomatic that the existing international corporate tax system is based
on the [value creation] principle” and there also appears to be “widespread agreement, at least
amongst policymakers, that the system should be based on this principle.” 81 Whether or not the
value creation principle can be the basis for a new global approach to taxing MNEs may depend
on several factors, including: (a) if the can be “operationalized” through legislation and
administration on a consensus basis; 82 and (b) if the principle can garnish international support.
And these are big “ifs”.
3.2.1 “Operationalize” the value creation principle
If the value creation principle can be translated into a source rule 83 for allocating the taxing rights
over MNEs’ profit among countries, it could replace the current residence-source paradigm.
Assuming rules can be developed for global value chain analysis and determining where and how

much value is created so that a MNE’s routine profits and residual profits can be allocated, there
is no need for the tax system to adhere to the residence principle. MNEs would be taxed based on
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the source of income as residence is not a meaningful nexus for tax jurisdiction. The activity of
incorporation does not create any value on its own. Originally, corporate residence was generally
tied to the place of value-creation activities, such as headquarter functions, place of carrying on
business. Recently, the use of intermediaries incorporated in no-tax jurisdictions is not
accompanied by such activities. The original assumption of the linkage between legal
incorporation and economic presence is no longer valid. The CFC rules already remove the tax
significance of corporate residence in the case of passive income. In countries adopting the
territorial system of taxation, corporate profits are already taxed on a source basis.
The value created in the country of corporate residence can be captured by the value creation
principle. For capital exporting countries, the value creation activities can be entrepreneurial
leadership, management and control, strategic planning, headquarter activities, providing capital,
and other activities such as research and development. The value creation principle is capable of
recognizing the profit derived from such activities. In many capital importing countries, MNEs
use either local subsidiaries or permanent establishments to carry on the local business. As such,
local residence and source of income give rise to the same level of taxing right and such right is
captured by the value creation principle as well.
If a global profit split method emerges in the future to take into account of sales of goods or
services, the value creation principle would lead to a more equitable distribution of taxing rights
among countries than the current system.
3.2.2 Political acceptance
The ambiguity of the value-creation principle may be its strength in the context of the BEPS
Project. It is high-sounding and makes intuitive sense. It appears to be self-explanatory to
politicians and laypersons: a foreign MNE owes tax in a country in which its value is created. To
put it differently, an MNE should pay tax in a country if its global value chain includes that country.
For example, if Starbucks sells a great deal of coffee in the UK, it should pay UK corporate tax.
At a technical level, the ambiguity may make it easier to bring tax officials and other participants
with varying degrees of tax expertise together to discuss highly complex tax rules as one can justify
the changes on ground of advancing this ambiguous, but high-sounding goal.
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Perhaps more profoundly, adopting the value creation principle suggests a desire for a more
fundamental shift, at least on the part of some members of the G20, particularly BRICS countries,
that were increasingly unsatisfied with the existing international tax system and wanted to have a
voice in reshaping it. 84 The traditional goal of international taxation to prevent double taxation can
longer capture what these countries wish to achieve. They want to have a share of the global tax
base that is greater than what is allocated to them under the existing system. They cannot achieve
that goal merely through protecting the existing tax base by having better anti-avoidance measures.
They can, however, have some leeway to “gain” additional tax base under the over-arching goal
of taxation based on value creation. From BRICS countries’ perspective, transfer pricing and
permanent establishment (for both traditional businesses and digital businesses) are key
problematic areas. Empirical evidence on BEPS implementation practices of BRICS and other
countries would likely show that they use BEPS to achieve both “base addition” and “base
protection” objectives. One would imagine that that was intended from the beginning of the BEPS
Project.
As shown by the BEPS Project, commitment by political leaders of powerful countries is critical
to launching the reform process and ensuring implementation. Political pressures may expedite the
process and deliver outcomes that can be communicated to the general public. Moreover, valuebased discussions may lead to consensus. But, high-level consensus may camouflage the real
differences among countries. For example, underneath the consensus on the value creation
principle in the BEPS Project, OECD countries may wish to clarify and update the guidance on
the application of the arm’s length principle, but non-OECD countries which regard transfer
pricing as the most important aspect of the project, 85 may wish to go beyond the arm’s length
principle and achieve a more “fair” allocation of the tax base. In terms of implementing the BEPS
measures, EU countries have taken a different approach from the US. BRICS have embraced BEPS
project and used it as an opportunity to embark on a new era of global tax governance.
A more value-based approach, as opposed to a more rule-based approach, may be more realistic
in the near future. The BEPS Project signaled that the process of reform has became more topdown because G20, with its political clout, directed the BEPS Project and relied on the OECD for
technical support. This is in contrast to the previous reform efforts led by the OECD, which follow
a bottom-up approach and was driven by technocrats who were specialized in fiscal policy and
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taxation.86 The BEPS project may also signal the end of American “constructive unilateralism” in
setting international tax standard.

87

In the past, American “tax architects”, such as Seligman,

Thomas and Carroll, were instrumental in shaping the international tax system 88 and American tax
policies have influenced other OECD countries and the work of OECD. In the future, EU may
take a different pathway, as is shown in the area of digital taxation. China and India have started
to challenge the existing norms.
The value creation principle may be broadly accepted as “fair”. The notion of “fairness” played
an important role in the BEPS Project. 89 In launching the project, G20 Leaders declared that
“cross-border tax evasion and avoidance undermine our public finances and our people's trust in
the fairness of the tax system.” 90 The notion of fairness may be the conceptual basis of the value
creation principle. 91 For example, BRICS countries supported the value creation principle while
stressing “the necessity of deepening international tax cooperation to build a fair and modern
international tax system and boost the world’s economic growth” (emphasis added). 92 BRICS
countries also vowed to implement the “G20 tax agenda” and acknowledged their “common
understanding that profits should be taxed in those jurisdictions where the activities generating
those profits are performed.” 93 The EU Commission has also noted that the value creation principle
“is essential for a fair and effective taxation in the single market”. 94 “The principle’s popular
appeal perhaps can also be understood on the grounds that it appears to follow an intuitive
understanding of fairness, along the lines of the benefits principle that contributions to the cost of
publicly-provided goods and services should be allocated based on the benefits derived from
them.” 95
Many developing countries have joined the Inclusive Framework, thereby embracing the value
creation principle. Some of these countries may suffer more harms from the BEPS than developed
countries for several reasons. First, BEPS practices erode the corporate tax base of the source
country and corporate tax generates a greater share of total tax revenues in developing countries,
and ss such, the adverse impact of revenue loss is more severe. 96 Second, developing countries’
tax laws are often less sophisticated and more susceptible to tax planning and the tax authorities
lack resources to enforce complex rules, such as transfer pricing rules. 97 An effective source-based
taxation, which was intended, arguably, by the value creation principle, could permit developing
countries to have a “fair” share of the MNE’s profit. 98 It is also possible that as a result of the
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BEPS Project, the effective increase in tax burdens will be greater in developed countries than in
developing countries, which will make doing business in developing countries more attractive. 99
Also, the value creation principle’s emphasis on actual economic activities may lead some MNEs
to relocate their value-creation activities physically to those developing countries that offer tax
incentives. 100 Therefore, even though the BEPS Project was launched by the world most powerful
countries to counter tax planning by powerful MNEs and was not designed to help developing
countries per se, the project has been accepted by developing countries. The value creation
principle may have contributed to their acceptance.

4

PROPOSING A GLOBAL PROFIT SPLIT APPROACH

4.1 Tackling the Issue of Residual Profit
Building on the momentum of the BEPS Project and the value creation principle, we propose to
allocate MNEs’ profits according to a global profit split approach 101 that is paired with a minimum
standard for tax competition. We think this approach is politically feasible, technically viable, and
conceptually aligned with the value creation principle.
At the heart of the challenges in allocating profits of MNEs is income from intangibles, which can
be conceptually understood as anything that is not tangible and has value. 102 The existing
transactional residual profit split method separates “routine profit” derived from tangible assets
and business functions and risks and “residual profit” attributable to intangibles. BEPS Action 810 Report states that:
For intangibles, the guidance clarifies that legal ownership alone does not necessarily
generate a right to all (or indeed any) of the return that is generated by the exploitation of
the intangible. The group companies performing important functions, controlling
economically significant risks and contributing assets, as determined through the accurate
delineation of the actual transaction, will be entitled to an appropriate return reflecting the
value of their contributions. Specific guidance will ensure that the analysis is not weakened
by information asymmetries between the tax administration and the taxpayer in relation to
hard-to-value intangibles, or by using special contractual relationships, such as a cost
contribution arrangement. 103

Because the BEPS Project aimed to revise (not redesign) the transfer pricing methods to align
profit for tax purposes with value creation, it suffers the flaws that plague the existing system. One
flaw is the adherence to the separate entity principle (treating each member of an MNE group as a
separate accounting unit), even though, in effect, the project has attempted to downplay the fiscal
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impact of legal fictions. 104 Another flaw is the transactional, comparability approach that is based
on the facts and circumstances of each case. Even with the enhanced data and information reporting
by MNEs, in addition to the practical complexity, conceptually, this approach does not treat the
MNE’s global business as a unitary business. Instead, it continues to allocate profits between two
parties to the transaction. Further, there is no or inadequate allocation to sales or market as the
method is supply-sided. The reform proposals canvassed below seek to address this core problem.

4.2 The Global Profit Split Proposal
The proposed global profit split or GPS approach modifies and extends the newly revised profit
split method to the global profits of MNE groups. It would allocate global profits to the involved
countries (where an MNE has economic and value-creation activities) in a two-step process: (1)
Routine profits would be allocated according to value-creation activities and functions (in
production countries) in a manner similar to the revised transfer pricing guidance; and (2) Residual
profits would be allocated according to a formula consisted of tangible assets, payroll/workforce
and sales. Once profit has been allocated to a jurisdiction, it is up to that jurisdiction to decide the
rate of tax, including zero rate. This is consistent with BEPS Action 5 as the profits subject to the
preferential taxation has substantial nexus to that jurisdiction.
The success of the proposed approach will depend on a high-level consensus on the rules for
determining global profits of an MNE group, the measurement and weight of apportionment
factors, and a mechanism for resolving tax disputes. Compared to the alternative international tax
reform proposals (see below), the GPS approach has some advantages.

4.3 Alternative Proposals
4.3.1 Destination-based Methods
A destination-based corporate tax 105 would treat MNEs as unitary businesses rather than a
constellation of separate legal entities. 106 It would allocate residual profits based on where they
sell their goods and services, that is, on a destination basis as opposed to the current origin basis
(where activities and value creation take place). Propnents suggest that it is the future of the
transfer pricing regime and corporate tax in general. 107 The location of consumers is less mobile
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than the location of property, employees, other elements of value creation. Three specific proposals
are canvassed below: a sales-based formulary apportionment, residual profit allocation on a
production line basis and residual profit allocation to marketing intangibles.
4.3.1.1 Sales-based formulary apportionment
A formulary apportionment method 108 would determine a MNE’s profits for US tax purposes
based on a fraction of the MNE’s worldwide income. The fraction would be the sum of (a) a fixed
return (suggested to be 7.5%) on the MNE’s expenses in the United States (as a measurement of
real economic activities) and (b) the share of its worldwide sales that occur in the United States.
The single factor formulary apportionment based on sales is similar to the current method used by
U.S. states in allocating national income across states. 109 U.S. states have traditionally used a threefactor formula (property, payroll and sales), but moved to the sole sales factor in order to attract
corporate investment in assets and jobs and sales is less mobile compared to assets and payroll.
According to the proponent, one of the advantages of this method is to “eliminate the tax incentive
to shift income through legal and accounting devices, such as licenses of patents and other
intangible property, to subsidiaries in zero-or low-tax countries” as “such shifting incentives often
entail the movement of employees and plants.” 110 Among the downsides of this method are its
arbitrariness (e.g., fixing the rate of return for routine profits and using sales as the allocation key)
and implementation challenges (such as defining the worldwide income, location of sales, and
interactions between countries with different tax systems).
4.3.1.2 Residual profit allocation on a product line basis
Similar to the sales-based formulary apportionment method, this method assigns a normal rate of
return to productive functions and allocate residual profit to the location of sales. But, proponents
of this method attempt to keep this method in the existing arm’s length transfer pricing regime by
avoiding a formulary apportionment method. Instead, the proposed method deems the country in
which sales take place to be an “entrepreneurial affiliate” with respect to local market sales and
ascribes all non-routine profits to that deemed affiliate. 111 In other words, other entrepreneurial
functions, such as manufacturing, R&D, services, and marketing receive routine profits only. In
other words, instead of allocating residual profit to the affiliate that is the owner or performs
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DEMPE [development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation of intangibles]
functions, the residual profit is allocated to affiliates in the market jurisdictions.
Further, this proposed method requires a product line and country by country determination: gross
revenues would be computed by country and by product using some concept of place of supply or
destination and global costs would be measured at a product line level and then either traced or
apportioned to revenues from specific countries. Because economic activities and value creation
activities are rewarded with routine profits, this method reduces the uncertainty by attributing
residual profit to the market jurisdiction using methods that are familiar under the existing transfer
pricing regime.
4.3.1.3 Residual profit allocation to marketing intangibles
This method can be viewed as a derivative of the above destination-based residual profit allocation
method. It goes one step further by singling out marketing intangibles. It would assign residual
profits to the market jurisdiction to the extent that they are derived from marketing intangibles and
leave residual profit from other intangibles to be assigned according to general transfer pricing
principles. 112
4.3.2 Alternative minimum tax on global profits
Without changing the existing paradigm of taxing MNEs on the basis of residence and source of
income, proposals of alternative minimum tax aim at ensuring that MNEs’ profits are taxed at a
minimal level. Earlier proposals by American scholars 113 and the Obama Administration in the
2016 draft budget 114 sought to strengthen residence-based taxation of U.S. based MNEs on a
worldwide basis by eliminating deferral of US tax. The basic thinking is similar to that behind the
controlled foreign corporation (CFC) rules in respect of foreign passive income. The 2017 US Tax
Reform extended the CFC regime to foreign income from intangibles under the GILTI (global
intangible low-taxed income) rules. 115 Both the US CFC rules and GILTI rules ensure the targeted
foreign income is taxed, at a minimum, at the US rate (which is half of the standard corporate tax
rate for GILTI). 116 CFC rules and GILTI rules are outbound rules as they target income derived
from foreign investment and activities.
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The 2017 US Tax Reform also introduced an inbound minimum tax in the form of BEAT (base
erosion anti-abuse tax). 117 Recently, scholars suggest introducing a minimum effective tax for
MNEs by pairing the inbound and outbound minimum taxes (i.e. BEAT plus CFC and GILTI) 118
or introducing a global general anti-avoidance rule mandating a minimum global tax rate. 119
The minimum tax approach has the advantage of building on the momentum of the BEPS Project
in tackling the problem of stateless income. It requires countries to agree to the minimum effective
tax rate and foregoing the use of tax incentives to attract substantive foreign investment. The latter
requirement may be perceived as encroaching tax sovereignty in that their tax incentive policies
would be rendered ineffective. To implement the proposal, countries would need to have a
benchmark corporate tax system and use the minimum tax as an alternative system. An advantage
of the proposal is that the existing international tax rules would continue and the minimum tax
would not replace it, but only backstop it.
4.3.3 Reversing the residence-source paradigm
Under the current international tax paradigm, passive income is taxed primarily in the residence
country and active income is taxed primarily in the source country. “Most of the current issues can
be solved by taxing passive income primarily at source and active income primarily at
residence.” 120 This proposal seeks to tackle both the corporate tax avoidance issue and personal
tax evasion problems. The assumption is that individuals earning passive income reside in a small
number of high-income countries: the US, EU countries and Japan. If the source country imposes
withholding tax on passive income, it would render the channeling of such income through
intermediaries in tax havens meaningless (for tax purposes). There is no need for residence
countries to get cooperation from tax haven jurisdictions.
As to active income, it should be taxed in the residence country. According to the proponents of
this method, since 90% of large MNEs are headquartered (resident) in G20 countries, if these
countries tax their MNEs’ global profit on a current basis (which is opposite to the current
territorial system), it would render tax planning practices to erode source countries’ tax ineffective.
This proposal is like the minimum tax proposal in that all business profits are subject to tax under
a CFC-like regime. In other words, CFC rules would be extended to global profits of MNEs
headquartered in G20 countries.
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Proponents of the reverse paradigm approach did not spell out the details on the implementation.
A great deal of faith was placed on the U.S. “constructive unilateralism”, 121 that is the United
States leads and other countries would follow. They acknowledge:
It is impossible to predict what will happen, but the history [in the US to deal with
deferral] suggests that there is a good chance that other G20 countries will follow
us if we abolish deferral at a lower rate. If that happens, all the usual objections to
worldwide taxation (competitiveness, inversions, and the various neutralities) lose
their force. We do not think there is a significant risk involved in this move, and
the potential upside is quite large. 122
4.3.4 The CCCTB - Multi-factor Formulary apportionment
The CCCTB (common consolidated corporate tax base) proposed by the European Commission
in 2016 123 is a multi-factor formulary apportionment regime. Under the CCCTB, the profit of all
entities being part of corporate group above a specified threshold (750 million Euros) turnover
would be computed under harmonized rules and the consolidated profits (and losses) would be
apportioned to each involved country according to a formula composed of fixed assets,
payroll/workforce and sales. 124 The EU also proposed that the CCCTB would apply to taxing
digital companies that 125 have a “digital presence” in a EU member scountry. 126
Unlike the destination-based formulary apportionment, the CCCTB applies to the entire group
profits, not just residual profits. By default, income derived from intangibles would be allocated
to countries based on the three factor, thereby favouring countries where productive activities and
sales take place, not where high-value intangibles are created. The required harmonization of rules
on computing profits and agreement on the measurement of the allocation factors have made it
difficult for the adoption of the CCCTB in the EU.

4.4 A Global Profit Split Approach for the 21st Century
Compared to the existing tax paradigm for taxing MNEs and the altnerative proposals, we suggest
that the proposed global profit split or GPS approach has some advantages. It is more aligned with
the value creation principle; it is evolutionary in nature; and has a greater chance of
implementation.
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4.4.1 Consistency with the value creation principle
In spite of the drawbacks canvassed in Part 2 above, the value creation principle could be viewed
as the first global tax principle. The proposed GPS approach is consistent with this principle.
Under this approach, the global business profit of MNEs is treated as the total taxable income (or
value) and is allocated to the involved jurisdictions where value is created. As such, no profit
would be allocated to pure intermediary jurisdictions. It differs from the existing transfer pricing
regime that fragmentizes the global profit into bits that can be measured by national tax laws,
leaving opportunities for some of the bits be allocated to intermediary jurisdictions.
Moreover, the proposed GPS approach is substance-based. Intra-group contractual arrangements
and the use of legal fictions are not relevant, and only value-creating activities and functions are
taken into account. It recognizes value creation activities taken place in production countries,
market countries as well as intangible-creation (or DEMPE) countries. As such, profit arising from
global value chains is captured and allocated to the countries involved in the chains. As compared
to the existing system which allows MNEs’ residual profit to low-tax intermediary jurisdictions127
the proposed GPS approach as the advantage of eliminating the attractiveness of channeling profits
to such jurisdictions. 128
It can be argued that the proposed GPS approach is more aligned with the business realities. The
business of MNEs are globally integrated, and the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. The
business is integrated when interdependent basic operations are carried on to a substantial extent
in different jurisdictions by the branches or subsidiaries that constitute the controlled enterprise.
The GPS approach recognizes this changed economic reality and can fairly allocate the residual
profit of an MNE to all participants in an integrated business. It is thus superior to existing
methods, which either cannot account for residual profit (in the case of transactional methods) or
cannot fairly allocate it. 129
Compared to the destination based proposals, the GPS approach recognizes value created in both
production jurisdictions, DEMPE jurisdictions and market jurisdictions and is thus more aligned
with the value creation principle. It is similar to the sales-based formulary apportionment proposal
and the CCCTB approach by using formulary method to allocate MNEs’ global profit. It differs
from the global minimum tax proposal by permitting countries to continue to operate preferential
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tax regimes as long as they are constrained to the profits that are allocated to them. In other words,
the proposed global profit split method ,
4.4.2 Evolutionary nature
The GPS approach represents a more “natural” evolution from the existing transactional profit split
method and the existing paradigm of taxing MNEs. As a “globalized” profit split method, the GPS
continues the tradition of separating routine profits and residual profits. It can be viewed as a
logical addition to the toolbox used to give meaning to the arm’s length principle. 130 In other
words, GPS is not a radical departure from the arm’s-length principle, but rather a natural
development in its evolution. The GPS approach can also be viewed as a logical global expansion
of the traditional formulary apportionment methods used by sub-national governments in Canada
and the United States or the globalization of the EU CCCTB mechanism. 131
The GPS is not a departure from the theoretical underpinnings of the existing international tax
system, that is the economic allegiance theory, tax benefit theory or tax neutrality theory. It
strengthens tax sovereignty by permitting countries to choose their tax rates (including zero rate)
for profit allocated to them. To the extent the GPS approach renders corporate residence redundant
as a basis for taxing MNEs’ income, the GPS can be viewed as protecting the tax base of countries
where value is created and residence status per se produces no value. Therefore, the GPS represents
incremental changes to the existing system which reflects the aphorism natura non facit saltum—
nature makes no sudden leaps. 132
It is true that the OECD has insisted that a “global formulary apportionment” using predetermined
formulae is inconsistent with the arm’s length principle. 133 However, the BEPS Project has
signaled greater use of profit split analyses. The OECD Revised Guidance on the Application of
the Transactional Profit Split Method – BEPS Action 10 (July 2018 ), while retaining the rhetoric
of transactional approach, states that profit split may be the most appropriate method in the
presence of one or more of the following indicators: each party makes unique and valuable
contributions; the business operations are highly integrated; or the parties share the assumption of
economically significant risks, or separately assume closely-related risks. The profit splitting
factors assets, capital, time spent or headcounts, data on which can be found in the CbCR filings.
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4.4.3 Technical feasibility
The GPS approach is technically feasible owing to the practical experience in applying profit split
method, national experience with formulary apportionment, and recent reform initiatives. In
practice, profit split methods are “routinely accepted by taxpayers and tax authorities alike”, and
“have become the standard method” in certain industries, such as global trading. 134 The increased
integration of global business operations “makes the use of profit splits unavoidable.” 135
More importantly, OECD countries are taking action that defies the OECD’s rhetorical insistence
that formulary apportionment is against the arm’s length principle. EU countries follow the arm’s
length principle in their domestic laws and tax treaties but may soon adopt the CCCTB regime.
Even if the CCCTB were not adopted in the near future, it has not been rejected on the ground of
violating the arm’s length principle. The enhanced global value chain analysis following the BEPS
Project is viewed as bridging the CCCTB and the arm’s length principle. 136
Through the GILTI, FDII and BEAT rules, the United States effectively adopted a “50-50 global
profit-split mechanisms in the 2017 Tax Reform: 137
On the one hand, these provisions are not specifically framed in terms of exceptions to the
arm’s length principle or the definition of “intangibles” of the OECD Guidelines, embodied
in Section 482 of the US Internal Revenue Code. On the other hand, they certainly reflect
a US Congressional conclusion that the existing transfer pricing and related principles of
US law are not, on their own, sufficient to protect the US tax base from aggressive effective
tax rate planning strategies … of MNEs. These mechanisms could be viewed as introducing
an underlying “intangible” in the form of a price to be paid for access to the US
marketplace. 138
Non-OECD countries have been less dogmatic about the arm’s length principle in general. For
example, China has permitted the use of any “reasonable method” in determining the appropriate
amount of profit of an MNE for Chinese tax purposes, including a share of global profit. 139 China,
India and Brazil declared in the UN Manual on Transfer Pricing that they do not fully accept the
OECD approaches to transfer pricing 140 They are determined “to shake up the international tax
system to assert very strongly the importance of the corporate income tax as a source tax and not
to give up on it” and the focus has mainly been on transfer pricing. 141 These countries and
developing countries may find the proposed GPS easier to apply and result in a fair outcome for
them.
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The CbCR, Multilateral Instrument and dispute resolution mechanisms introduced by the BEPS
Project are expected to help countries implement the GPS approach. Even if developing countries
lack capacity to administer the formulary apportionment regime, they would not lose any existing
tax base because of routine profits would be allocated to production activities.
4.4.4 Political feasibility
The strongest argument in favor of the GPS approach over the alternative proposals is the political
feasibility. We can assume that the world has four types of countries in terms of value creation:
production countries that produce goods and services, market countries where goods and services
are sold; DEMPE countries where intangibles are created, and tax haven countries that are
intermediary jurisdictions. The proposed GPS approach has a better chance of being perceived to
be fair by all countries except tax havens. Production countries would have a tax base reflecting a
routine return on productive activities as well as a share of residual profit attributable to productive
factors (assets and people). DEMPE countries would receive a share of global profit based on
assets and payroll. Market countries would have a tax base reflecting a share of residual profit
based on sales, which is better than the existing system under which they are not entitled to sharing
the residual profit. Tax haven jurisdictions have been the target of harmful tax practices initiatives
and the BEPS Project and will not receive any share of global profit unless value-creation activities
occur there. Non-tax haven countries would be expected to continue to have a united front in
preventing profit shifting to tax havens.
In the foreseeable future, tax policies will continue to reflect the fiscal choices of each sovereign
state. The proposed GPS approach respects tax sovereignty by allowing countries to continue to
decide if they want to engage in tax competition. Developing countries that prefer to use tax
incentives to attract direct foreign investment would likely support such approach. Capital
exporting countries can continue to use anti-abuse regimes to ensure that they can tax their share
of the global profit (as determined under the GPS).
More importantly, perhaps, the GPS approach can lead to a more equitable outcome for developing
countries which are production countries and/or market countries, but may have limited resources
to asses MNEs. By allocating global profits according to a formula consisted of tangible assets,
payroll/workforce and sales, the GPS approach can help reduce the erosion of source-based
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taxation in developing countries. It might be possible that a developing country’s share is
established under the GPS approach without involving much administrative resources of the
developing country. The GPS approach would be simpler than the existing transfer pricing regime.
In summary, the proposed GPS approach enjoys several advantages over the existing system for
allocating international income. The GPS would be more equitable in allocating income among
jurisdictions and be more consistent with both economic theory and the economic reality of how
MNEs conduct their business. It could also help reduce tax incentives for shifting profit to tax
havens. In terms of the overall structure of the international tax system, the GPS could simplify
the system by reducing the need for other anti-avoidance rules that were designed to deal with
problems unresolved by the transfer-pricing approach.
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